McMaster Philosophy Talks: Pondering the Pandemic - The Crux of Decision-Making in a Crisis

Talk #2: The Crux of Decision-Making in a Crisis: William James and the Rationality of Our Pandemic Decisions Professor James Sikkema will facilitate a discussion with Dr. Alex Klein. Suppose my job is to provide support for families of children with severe disabilities. Do the risks of returning to work outweigh the harms these kids and their families face if they do not receive my support? What about my children — should I risk sending them to camp or to school so that I can return to work? Should I risk a visit to the dentist, or to the doctor for a non-COVID procedure? All of us are facing vexing questions about how to live our lives under this pandemic. Even as scientists continue to improve our understanding of COVID-19, the choices we face outstrip any available evidence. There is always a dose of uncertainty involved in epidemiological modeling. We’ve had less than a year to study this virus; we need more time. Even if we could snap our fingers and get years of research on COVID-19 into our models, practical questions about how to weigh one risk against another seem personal and subjective. If a fully rational decision is based on sound logic and sufficient evidence only, then does that mean the big choices we face are not fully rational? Do they also depend on elements like fear, hope, or faith? There is an old philosophical debate about whether we are ever permitted to make choices in the absence of compelling evidence. On one side were so-called evidentialists like William Clifford and Charles Sanders Peirce, who strictly forbade action without sufficient evidence. On the other were critics like William James, who held that that there are special cases where we are simply forced to make momentous decisions before we can yet have adequate evidence, and we cannot be obligated to do what is not in our power. What makes for a good decision under these harrowing circumstances?